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Argumenting, Understanding, Misunderstanding

The text we are here presenting unites papers written in English and French for delivery at the International Summer Institute for Semiotic Studies and Structural Studies, ISISSS, June 10-18, 1999 and at the Annual Meeting of the Semiotic Society of Finland, June 10-13, 1999. The first and third text is by Augusto Ponzio, the second is by Susan Petrilli.

1. The argumentative logic of the Helsinki conference and the ideo-logic of communication-production

Communication-production is the communication of the world as it is today. It is *world* communication, not only in the sense that it extends over the whole planet, but also in the sense that it corresponds to, it is accomodated to the *world*. Better still: it is the communication of *this world*. *Communication* and *reality*, *communication* and *being* coincide.

Realistic politics (but if it is not realistic, it is not politics) is politics appropriate for the reality of world communication, for the being of communication-production. There is a logical connection between *politics* and *ontology*. For this reason, politics is pre-disposed for *war*, the most crudely, brutally *realistic face of being*. Today, politics is specified as a relation with the ontology of world communication-production. The realism of politics must correspond to ontology, to the point of accepting the *extrema ratio* of war, in accordance with the strict law of the *force of things*.

The project of increasing communication and its control is aimed at the preservation of communication-production. This project is the *ideology* of communication-production. It is so realistic, so close to the being of things that it appears — waving about the good news of the end of ideologies — *more like its logic than its ideology*. We shall call it “*ideologic*” of *world communication-production*.

In fact, ideology functional to preserving this particular social form ends up, in good and bad faith, by passing this preservation off as that of *social reproduction in general*. However,

owing to its destructive character, the current form of social organisation *impedes and endangers* social reproduction, indeed all of semiosis, *global semiosis* and therefore all life on the planet.

Communication-production has a *destructive character* — and planning faithful to its ideologic cannot avoid recognizing it. The European Commission, dedicating particular attention to inventiveness and innovation as regards profit and market (see *The green book on innovation*, 1995), identifies "*innovation*" and "*destruction*". The innovative character of the product is paradoxically — but in full respect of capitalistic logic — made to consist of its destructive capacity: destructive of similar products already available on the market. Innovative capacity up to the mark of the "actual", of "present reality" coincides with destructive capacity. Walter Benjamin had already identified this mechanism in his paper of 1931 on the destructive character of the actual, of present reality.

The destructive character of the present form of production also derives from the fact that it produces ever larger and more widespread areas of *underdevelopment*, as the condition itself of development. We are talking about the areas of human exploitation and loss of the quality of life and differing degrees of misery which reach the impossibility to survive. A consequence of all this is the growing phenomenon of *migration*, that "developing" countries cannot contain due to objective internal limits to the capacity for hospitality. These limits are no doubt greater than those of other forms and phases of social organisation, according to which social reproduction has been carried out historically.

World communication-production is also destructive because it is *communication-production of war*. War always needs new markets for conventional and unconventional weapons, and it needs greater and more extended approval that recognises it as just and necessary, as a means of defence against the increasing danger represented by the "other", and as a means of imposing the rights of "one's own identity", of "one's own difference". *Identity* and *difference* which, in fact, is not threatened or destroyed by the "other", but by this social form itself which encourages and promotes them. No doubt it has also made them totally *fictitious* and *phantasmal*., but it is precisely because of this that we cling to them paroxysmally. And all this suits communication-production of war perfectly.

The *Gulf War* in 1991 marked a *decisive change*, on a world-wide level, regarding the idea and the practice of war, which from that moment onwards is made to circulate in world-wide communication-production as "just and necessary", as a "policing action", and even as a "humanitarian operation".

World-wide communication-production requires forms of control that are just as world-wide and functional to the world order, thanks to which world communication-production can be

reproduced. This world order must be guaranteed and maintained by agreements, pacts and unions between developing countries. This type of international agreement or pact or union *has priority* over others, which may be useful for "development" and "competition" within the world communication-production sphere, but also need to be assured the space to carry out the "development" and the "competition". Therefore, a strategically efficient agreement in this sense with a wide "defensive" range obviously takes priority. Moreover, even if it was not stipulated recently, this agreement is *more up to date* than other chronologically more recent ones. This explains the subordination of the European Union to the fifty year-old Nato, and the "inevitability" of its participation in the "humanitarian disaster" produced by this other "just and necessary war".

This is the conception of war as it was asserted in 1991 and onwards, in place of the previous conception which had dominated in Europe since World War II.

This new conception, which excludes war as a solution to international conflict, was expressed in the principle of the absolute non justifiability of the use of force or even of threat among States a part from whether they participated or not in the agreement, and formulated in the *Helsinki Final Act*, a document produced by the *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe* (1975),.

The latter conception, which peremptorily refuses war as a solution to international conflict, found expression in the *Helsinki Final Act* of the *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe* (1975) in the principle of the absolute non justifiability of recourse to threat or to the use of force among those States that signed the accord as well as concerning relations with non participatants.

Here we shall discuss the *Helsinki Final Act* with the aim of examining its argumentative logic. The adoption of the Helsinki Final Act and its signing by thirty-three participant European states, the USA and Canada on August 1st, 1975 was unanimously considered a milestone in East-West relations.

During the 1980s the European Co-ordination Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Science (Vienna) promoted a series of meetings, held in different countries in Europe, for a semiotic analysis of the *Helsinki Final Act* :

Budapest, January 1985; Prague, November 1985; Trieste, May 1986; Moscow, November 1986; Pécs, May 1987; Dubrovnik, October 1987; Leipzig, May 1988; Sofia, November 1988, Rotterdam, January 1989.

The title of the project, established in a meeting in Dubrovnik in 1984 was the following:
La semiotique dans la recherche comparative. La vocabulaire des relations internationales: l'acte Final de la Conférence d'Helsinki.

The participants coming from twelve different countries included:

Adam Schaff, Honorary President of the European Co-ordination Centre, Christiane Villain-Gandossi, Adjunct Director of the European Co-ordination Centre, Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, Paolo Facchi, Klaus Bochman, Momir Milojevic, János Kelemen, Christina Schäffner and myself.

The results of the project included:

The re-publication, in Germany (Wilhelmsfeld: Egert, 1990), of the *Helsinki Final Act* by the European Co-ordination Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Sciences along with scientific analysis of the concepts and notions contained in the *Helsinki Final Act.: L'Acte Final d'Helsinki. Texte et Analyse* ;

and the book edited by Ch. Villain-Gandossi and others *The Concept of Europe in the process of the CSCE* (Tübingen: Gunter Narr 1990).

The *Final Act* has continued to lose its paradigmatic value especially during the nineties. In the analyses that follow, we shall evidence the *internal* causes for this. These *internal causes* should be sought in its *argumentative loci* , in its *concepts* and *categories*.

It is a question of verifying whether there is a certain *weakness in argumentation* in the Helsinki text, concerning the logic of war, which may have contributed to its current failure. If this is the case, we must search for the causes them in the *premises* on which it was founded. Let us see.

In the *Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE, re-publication 1990)*, the nation is identified with the State, therefore with the political and economic community. Consequently nations are discussed calling them States (the participating States or non-participating States) or peoples whose interests and aspirations the States express (“the States and their peoples”) and are responsible for. The participating States (the European States of the time plus USSR, Turkey, Canada, The United States) commit themselves to respect the equality of peoples and their right to self determination. So that the participating States “will respect the right of every State to juridical equality, to territorial integrity and to freedom and political independence. They will also respect each other’s right to freely choose and develop its own political, social, economic and cultural systems as well as its rights to determine its laws and regulations” (CSCE 1990: 78)

The term "Nation" appears in the reference to the United Nations and as an implicit referent in "international relations", or in "peace, safety and international justice", in which it is still a question of relations between States and between the Peoples that they represent. However, "Nation" is also used indirectly as an adjective in the expression "national minorities". Here the reference to nation as an ethnic community, to nationalities which "exist on territory of states", is obvious. The States commit themselves to "respecting and protecting the rights" of the nation thus considered and to guaranteeing them the "fundamental freedom" and the "full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights" (*ibid.*: 80).

The objective of the Helsinki conference is that "of promoting better relations among themselves [the States] and ensuring conditions in which their people can live in true and lasting peace, free from any threat or attempts against their security" (*ibid.*: 77). The participating State will refrain "in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of United Nations and with the present Declaration. No consideration may be invoked to warrant resorting to threats or use of force in convention of this principle" (*ibidem*).

Consequently, the *Helsinki Final Act* emerges as an agreement which regulates reciprocal relations between *autonomous and sovereign identities* (the State-nations), which these States relate to each other on the principle of "sovereign equality" (*ibid.* : 78). Instead, the *Helsinki Final Act* makes no reference to the nation as a *difference*, except in terms of the "individuality" of the States and, therefore, of their relative reciprocal otherness which each state-national identity commits itself to respect, or in terms of "national minorities" (ethnic), as nationality inside the state-national territory whose rights the text under analysis recognises and respects.

Some considerations on the dual meaning of "nation" will now be in place: "nation" as *identity* and as *difference*.

The nation is one of the *concrete-abstractions* in which community identity is achieved. It is something fictitious and something material at the same time. But there again all social-political products are so, because they are made of signs, of *semiotic matter*, including the economic and political system *World*. Even this is a construction, a projection (in a geographical as well as in an ideological sense, as social planning) to which nation identity belongs.

As a category of *identity* the nation is also a category of *difference*. This dual aspect is evidenced in the ambivalence of the term "nation", in its dual meaning. On the one hand,

a) *the essentially political meaning*, expressed in the age of Enlightenment and in the French Revolution: nation and State in which the *sovereignty of the people* reigns;

on the other, the *ethno-linguistic* meaning, developed during the Romantic age, according to which one nation differs from other nations.

The two meanings evidence two different ways of conceiving the origin of nation identity.

In the first case the origin is *political-juridical-economic* and therefore this identity is recognised for what it is, that is, a *historical-social product*..

In the second case, its origin is considered to be *natural*, and even though historical-social factors like language and cultural traditions are involved beyond "natural" factors like blood and land, the former are conceived as natural (the expression "natural languages", even in common speech, is symptomatic) and in any case as *naturally* determining national difference.

As identity, the nation is the State in which the sovereignty of the people applies, or simply the territorial State, if the people-nation do not exercise their own sovereignty. In any case, it is a community recognised in its historical-social character. As difference, the nation is a natural community which finds expression, or does not, in the State.

As State, as people, as a community of citizens, the nation is a positive juridical entity. As a "natural community", the nation enters the perspective of the doctrine of natural law on the basis of which the "natural rights" of one's own difference are asserted appealing to common natural characteristics which would seem to differentiate one "nation" from the others.

Compared to the nation as a positive identity, coinciding with the State, the nation as a natural difference is connoted as "nationality": as natural identity-difference, "nationality" is antecedent to the constitution of the State-nation and may not coincide with it to the point of appearing as a "minority nationality" or as an "oppressed nationality" inside the State nation.

The critical, transgressive character regarding existing States, the political structuring of the system called World, which is inherent to the nation as difference in the "ethnic-linguistic" sense as well as in the sense of natural laws, explains why this meaning leads the other sense, the political, in moments of transformation of historical reality (see the phase of "the ascent of the bourgeoisie", or the anti-colonial and anti-imperial movements in Asia and in Africa) and why, instead, they contrast when the interest in preserving state identities prevails over the rights of the differences.

However, the meaning of nation as a natural difference involving blood, language, culture, land also lends itself, considering the indissolubility of identity and difference, to reinforcing the nation in terms of a real political identity and, therefore, in the name of the nation, of repression — and suppression, genocide — of nationalities that are "naturally" different to it

(nationalism, fascism, nazism). There are no limits of a spatial order in the use that national political identity — depending on local political and economic interests as well as on those of the World system it belongs to — can make of national ethnic-linguistic differences: national political identity can use such differences to expand its own territory through a policy of annexation (the annexation of Austria to Nazi Germany), or to break up a previous political organisation (see Yugoslavia, ex-USSR, Czechoslovakia) into different national communities, which, in certain cases may be considered as "Regional States" more than national States (also because of their subordination to control by the strongest capitalist countries).

Safeguarding the rights of the differences and reciprocal co-operation among the people of the participating States to assure the conditions by means of which they can benefit from a “true and lasting peace”: these are *the two basic points of the Helsinki conference*. They reconduct the concept of nation *to its political and economic-political (and not ethnical) origin* making it coincide with that of *State-Nation* as an economic-political identity and in which the sovereignty of the national people is exercised.

At the same time these principles take account of the nation as difference, both

a) in terms of reciprocal otherness, in other words as a diversity of "political, economic or social systems" as well as “size, geographical location or level of economic development” (*ibidem*) — difference that must not stop reciprocal collaboration and hinder reciprocal respect —; and

b) in terms of the possible presence of “national minorities” which make up the State-nation; territory does not identify the State-nation as such or naturally; and while the participating States agree on reciprocal respect of the “territorial integrity of each of the participating states” (*ibid.*: 79), they also agree that “their frontiers can be changed, in accordance with international law, by peaceful means and by agreement” (*ibid.* : 77).

In the text of the Helsinki conference States and collaboration among States are not considered to be at the service of entities like Communication or Production or the Nation assumed as pre-existing to the State and as a natural cultural entity which must find its place in the economic-political system called World through the national State. On the contrary, States are considered instrumental “to improve the well-being of peoples and contribute to the fulfilment of their aspirations” (*ibid.*: 81). With respect to this aim economic, scientific, technical and cultural development and the development of cooperation among States are equally instrumental. Improvement of the living conditions of the peoples, to which the States commit themselves, in the declaration, includes “the narrowing of difference” in the levels of economic development “throughout the world”, all of this in the “interest of all” (*ibidem*).

The text of the *Helsinki Final Act* is entirely organised as a *hypothetical imperative* ("if you want then) in which the end is *the improvement of people's welfare on a world level*. And it is not only the welfare of participant States. The conditions of this welfare are the realisation of peace, of reciprocal comprehension, of equality, of justice, of reciprocal knowledge, reciprocal responsibility and solidarity amongst peoples.

Rather than marking the difference between national identities, the *Final Act* of Helsinki marks their "sovereign equality", considering them as States and as peoples, and evidencing the need for reciprocal relations of *non-indifference*. If national differences are considered, they concern the national minorities inside the States, concerning which the *Helsinki Final Act* requires from the respective States, in this case as well, non-indifferent relations that safeguard the rights of the minorities in question through a common commitment, and that recognise their juridical equality compared to the rest of the national population.

Otherness with respect to state national identity is therefore seen as a difference which not only is not a contrast and contraposition but also non-indifferent with respect to other identities, both in the sense that differences are not neglected nor are they cancelled in common identity, as well as in the sense that relations of co-operation and reciprocal aid between States are established on the basis of *reciprocal responsibility*.

All the same, if we look closely, the otherness relation varies in the text, above all, between

1) a relation of *conventional reciprocity, established between self-sufficient entities* which assume determined reciprocal obligations by free choice, according to an ideology of the *pact*, of the *voluntary subscription to a treaty*;

2) a *relation of assimilation of the Other* by researching the conditions of co-operation *in common history*, in a *common past*, in the existence of *common elements of traditions and values*: this is the ideology that also subtends national identity as ethnic group, the ideology of the possibility of unity and understanding between those belonging to the same history, the same tradition, the same culture. Consequently, the opening to an agreement and to *world communication*, which indeed are also present in the *Helsinki Final Act*, no longer find a justification.

In the *Final Act* there is, however, a *third sense* in which we may understand the relation of otherness between the States-nation, that is, that such a relation is a relation of *unchosen compromise of undecided solidarity*, of *necessary and undergone responsibility*, as a consequence

a) of world economic interdependence;

b) of the level reached by technological development, which leads to the impossibility of territorial restriction of pollution, of the danger of radioactivity, of the greenhouse effect, etc., as well as the territorial non-circumscribability of new needs produced by technology with the consequent increase in the inequality between development and under development;

c) of the inseparability of safety and welfare in one part of the world (Europe, the West, the North of the World) from the safety and welfare of all the rest: the impossibility of improving the living conditions of the peoples and of protection and improvement of the environment without international (interstate) co-operation.

According to this third sense, the relationship of otherness as non indifferent difference among national identities does not depend on relations of reciprocity established by a pact, on a convention and on the possibility of assimilation inside a past made of common traditions. In spite of their difference and extraneousness, including the eventual extraneousness of some of the States to the relation agreed upon, sanctioned by a convention or a treaty, between these States and their people there exists a relation of solidarity that is suffered, for which there are no self sufficient identities and such that they are not involved in the situation and in the destiny of the other identities, even without them having decided it.

The text of this conference goes in this direction when, for example, it recognises: — the indivisibility of safety in Europe and the whole world, independently of any pacts or treaties;

— the absolute necessity of protecting the environment and of international co-operation;

— the dependence of peace in Europe on peace in the world to the point that the principles that (from this point of view) support the relations between participating States — including the principle that force may not be resorted to under any circumstance and that no justification can be invoked for recourse to threats or to the use of force — are considered valid by the text under discussion for application to non participating States as well.

According to the third sense of co-operation and realisation of peace, "the objective of promoting better relations between States" works as a medium term, in other words it is part of the minor premise, of an inference in which we find "world peace, security and well-being for all peoples" in the major premise, and which is formed as follows:

Major premise: "the participating states aim at peace, security and well-being for all peoples";

Minor premise: But given "the indivisibility of security in Europe" and considering "the close link between peace and security in Europe and in the world as a whole", there can be no peace, security and

well-being without improving reciprocal relations among States (participating and non participating States).

Conclusion: So, the improvement of reciprocal relations among States (participating and non) must be promoted.

The whole argumentation is based on the conception (expressed by the minor premise) of compromise, of responsibility that has not been agreed upon and of inevitable solidarity — of necessary non-difference — towards the Other.

But the other two senses, mentioned above, of co-operation and reciprocal responsibility interfere with this type of argumentation: in other words, the sense which make co-operation and reciprocal responsibility derive from a pact, considering them to be assumed by free choice by autonomous and self-sufficient entities; and the sense which to support them appeals to common traditions, to a common past, to a common heritage of values. According to this sense, the possibility of "improving reciprocal relations between States" is made to depend on "their common history" and on the recognition of the existence of "elements common to their traditions and values" (*ibid.*: 77).

For the first type of argumentation, responsibility is understood as limited responsibility, the kind of responsibility that is limited to undersigning an agreement, which presupposes the free choice of the aim to be realised: "world peace, security and well-being for all peoples";

For the second type of argumentation, reciprocal responsibility between States derives from the possibility of reconducting them to common elements traceable in their past, in their tradition and in their history. It is the same type of argumentation on which the idea of nation as ethnic difference is founded, although, as we have seen, the *Helsinki Final Act* takes its distances from it by conceiving the State as a political-economical identity.

This interferes with non-identity responsibility, with responsibility that knows no loopholes, no escape, responsibility without alibis which involves and exposes us totally, being a type of responsibility that the Helsinki does not fail to evoke.

As a consequence of the lack of concentration on the third sense of the otherness relation among national identities and, therefore, on the third type of argumentation, the *Final Act* of Helsinki neglects to make an in-depth analysis and to demonstrate the reasons for international co-operation, for improvement of relations with non participating States as well. Peace and co-operation on a world level, as an objective, is not fully justified. And the text of the Helsinki Conference ends up being a sort of *list of good* intentions. Consequently, it loses its argumentative force and the possibility of exerting a real influence on international politics, as in fact has emerged ever more clearly since the Gulf war in 1991 with the idea of war as just and necessary through to the present day.

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2. The objective nature of misunderstanding. When the mystifications of language are the cause

The question is, whether this state of things is quite so inevitable as most of us seem to think. Certainly, so long as we are content to live in the fool's paradise of supposing that only the perverse, the prejudiced, the stupid, or the ignorant can possibly mistake our meaning, and that our misreadings of others are simply due to their "obscurity" or "quibbling", or literary incapacity, we shall ourselves contrive to the hopelessness of the situation. But this is a subject which cannot be dealt with in an incidental way; it is rather a hope for the future, that one of the most practically serviceable of subjects — that of meaning, its conditions and its changes — shall be seriously taken up (Welby 1985b: 512).

1. *The "maladies of language"*

The great plurality of experience, ordinary and scientific, may be focused on the problem of meaning which, in turn, supplies a unifying perspective on the kaleidoscopic plurality of existence and communication. To concern oneself with the problem of meaning involves analyzing its conditions of possibility as well as its articulations and transformations, subsequent and contemporary, in relation to both verbal and nonverbal behavior and, therefore, relatively to linguistic and nonlinguistic signs. This is the approach adopted by Victoria Welby (1837-1912), the ideator of significs, who took an interest not only in the problems of ordinary life and ordinary language but in all the sciences in so far as they are expressions of human sign activity and therefore of the multiple and diversified instances of signifying processes, of the processes of interpretation and expression. All perception, experience, cognition is mediated by signs, so that the relation between the object of analysis and the cognitive subject is not at all direct but mediated by signs in interpretive processes. And given that our relation to so-called "objective" reality is mediated by signs, so that the interpretation of signs, verbal and nonverbal, inevitably involves us all, we are all potential "significians".

In language that makes frequent use organic images taken from the organic world, in what today we would call a biosemiotic perspective, Welby speaks of the "maladies of language", of "linguistic pathology" in great part attributed to the antiquated character of words and propositions, to the use of outdated metaphors and analogies often the source of false problems and misunderstanding both in our use of special languages as well as in the everyday exchanges of ordinary speech. Starting from her description of the unfortunate state of language and expression, Welby points to the necessity of activating linguistic therapy through the development of a critical linguistic consciousness, so that an important aim in her work is that of supplying an adequate theoretical basis for a correct diagnosis of "linguistic pathology" as the starting point for

regeneration, through improvement of the human capacity to perceive real distinctions among signs and thereby to interpret their senses and meanings more exactly (v. Petrilli 1998a: IV.3, IV.4). Significs as the science or theory of signs and meaning, takes on the double task of theoretical analysis and but also of therapeutic remedy in its attempt to offer suggestions for the solution to the problems of expression at a practical level as well. And when she analyzes linguistic pathology, especially the problem of ambiguity giving rise to equivocation, Welby turns her attention to the speaker in general and, therefore, to the man of the street as well and not just the intellectual, who by comparison with the former of course has the extra responsibility of committing himself to the work of cure and recovery at the metalinguistic level also. In any case, the state of confusion provoked by a lack of critical consciousness towards language and logical procedure generally concerns us all indiscriminately insofar as we are each and every one of us part of the signifying paths generated in the signifying universe.

2. Ambiguity, "precision" and the "panacea of definition"

Welby analyzes such problematics as the value of "ambiguity" of the word; the role of "definition" in the determination of meaning; the relationship between literal meaning and metaphorical meaning; the contribution of metaphor, analogy, homology to the amplification of the expressive potential of language, maintaining the thesis of the "plasticity" of language as the condition that makes possible the capacity for growth, regeneration, expressive pregnancy and allusive reference (cfr. Welby 1985a: ccxli & ccliv). A characteristic of verbal language is its potential for "expressive ambiguity" where a distinction is made between *ambiguity in the sense of plurivocality constitutive of the word*, understood therefore as a positive attribute that favors a vision of reality that is increasingly enriched and multiform and, therefore, as a necessary condition for expressivity and understanding on the one hand, and *ambiguity as obscurity*, expressive inadequacy generating confusion, equivocation, in everyday life at the cognitive and practical levels as well as in the intellectual field and at a metadiscursive level, on the other, the negative effects of which Welby constantly denounces offering innumerable examples throughout her writings (cfr. *Ibidem*: XIII, 37-38). Her characteristic recourse to analogies of the organismic type to talk about language ensues therefore from the need to evidence "plasticity", "adaptability" as distinctive features of our "expressive potential", of language and signs in general and the logical procedures generated in them.

These distinctive features of language need to be recovered where they have been compromised or lost altogether as a consequence of "bad linguistic use" and reconsidered where they prove to be misunderstood as a result of inadequate conceptions of language. Welby, therefore, considers reciprocal adaptability between words and context to be analogous to the reciprocally adaptive mechanisms relating organisms and their environment (though she warns us against

pushing the analogy too far): "we must postulate an analogy between context and environment: the adaptation of the word, as of the organism, to its surroundings, and conversely its effect upon these. If we enthrone one queen-word instead of another in the midst of a hive of working context-words, these will behave very differently. They will expel or kill or naturalize it" (Welby 1983: 40 and note). To be a significian, therefore, does not mean to be a "precisionist" in the sense of working for the "mechanical exactitude of language", but of underlining how a lack of understanding of the ambiguous nature of meaning produces monological interpretive practices and sets the conditions for the tyranny of dogma and orthodoxy. At a metadiscursive level Welby kept her distances from technicalism, as much as she was ready to propose new terms for the study of language and meaning, criticizing the expectation, or rather, false objective, of having to eliminate ambiguity from words, their polysemy, though she was committed to making her expressions as precise as possible. Welby was well aware of the dialectic complementarity and interdependency between indeterminacy and determinacy, between vagueness and exactitude, in the last analysis between alterity and identity.

The development of the "linguistic consciousness", therefore, implies the development of the interpretive capacity against subjection to dogmatism, pedantry and anarchy in logical inference, language and behavior. To call attention upon polysemy, the ambiguity of words, to semantic plasticity, as Welby says, means, on the contrary, to open up to their expressive potential. Not only, such signifying modalities of the sign constitute the condition itself of interpersonal communication as it is achieved in interaction between the codified aspects of language, on the one hand, and interpretive work or activity (which does not at all consist of mere decodification), on the other, thereby favoring adaptive processes in relation to new and changing contexts, knowledge and habits of behaviour.

Freeing language from the so-called "linguistic traps" that obstacle its free development and perfecting, as Wittgenstein also says, is the condition for favoring increase in expressive potential, knowledge and therefore man's mastery over his own environment. However, differently from semantics according to the approach adopted by Michel Bréal, and as the philosopher Henry Sidgwick (1838-1900) had also occasion to observe, the greatest advantage as far as recourse to definition is concerned is the process of working towards it rather than its actual formulation.

While recognizing the usefulness of definition for limited purposes, that is, to the end of identifying the meaning of words and propositions in determinate contexts of discourse, Welby does not extend such usefulness in an absolute sense and infact distinguishes between "rigid definition", which is always secondary because of its tendency to freeze meaning and render it static in the orientation toward a single, univocal meaning and "plastic primary definition" (cf. Welby 1985c) which instead keeps account of the live character of language and therefore of its capacity for adaptation to new signifying contexts. Regarding the latter, the Italian philosopher and mathematician Giovanni Vailati also perspects a more extended view of definition which rather

than be limited to single words is turned to the determination of the meaning of propositions, and infact the meaning of single words is often only determined in relation to other words, in the linguistic context, in the context of the proposition itself: to exemplify his standpoint Vailati indicates such terms as "to be", "to act", "to produce", "to represent", "to manifest", etc. And the meaning of the linguistic context itself is also determined in the relationship with single words (cf. Vailati/Welby, 12th July 1898 in Vailati 1971: 140-142; Welby/Vailati, 27 Febr. 1907, unpublished corespondence).

In any case, what is most worth expressing and interpreting often escapes definition (cfr. Welby 1983: 10), whose effective usefulness, as mentioned, is restricted to specific fields of knowledge and science. Similarly to Vailati, and as such scholars as Ferruccio Rossi-Landi, Adam Schaff and Mikhail M. Bakhtin (1895-1975) were subsequently also to recognize, Welby too believed that polysemy is a positive aspect of words, in addition to being inevitable, and that expressive precision may be attained by exploiting the resources of language itself by distinguishing between words which are apparently similar and relating similar words which only apparently have different meanings, in the effort to identify and explicit the differences.

The concept of meaning in a signific perspective does not respond to the rigid binary view that distinguishes between two poles, "metaphorical, indirect or reflective meaning", on the one hand, and "literal, direct or actual meaning", on the other, where the term "literal" is considered to be more figurative and more ambiguous than the term "metaphorical" (cf. Welby 1985b: 512). Welby, instead, hypothesizes a third region of meaning that characterizes signifying practices, a "third value" of meaning — which is neither entirely literal nor entirely figurative — in which the "metaphorical" and the "literal" combine in varying degrees (cf. Welby 1983: 139, 292; cf. also Rossi-Landi 1985: 115-120).

With the hypothesis of a "third value" or "third region" of meaning, Welby theorizes a contact zone among interpretant signs which has no precise limits because of the very nature of signs which continuously interact and generate new interpretive paths. She acknowledges that metaphorical meaning is widespread and structural in the processes of the production of meaning and knowledge, and not only limitedly to literary writing. Infact, this indeterminate third value of meaning invests all language, including ordinary language, where the actual and the symbolic, the real and the ideal, the direct and the reflective mingle as in a painting. Welby demonstrates how in different moments the same expression can move across the entire range of meanings thereby revealing its ambiguous nature and, therefore, its potential for adaptation and transformation, and be used differently whether in actual and direct terms or in the symbolic, or in some combined form as required by the effective communicative situation.

On a diachronic axis the meanings of words and the values they recall both explicitly and implicitly are accumulated, superimposed upon each other, transformed, cancelled, regenerated; on

a synchronic axis the unique experience of the single speaker influences the way the word is perceived and interpreted, so that factors are at work that condition meaning value according to a structure that is never identical to itself: the specific communicative context, the life context, social *milieu*, linguistic context, historico-socio-cultural factors, cultural and mental *background* of interlocutors, inference procedure, feelings, state of mind, psychological atmosphere, degree and focus of attention, communicative intention, associations, allusions, assumptions, implications, entymemes, memory, circumstance, linguistic usage, the tendency to symbolize or picture, the a priori conditions of language, etc. (cf. Welby 1893: 512-513). These are variables that, as anticipated, in the light of the genetically and structurally dynamic, ambiguous, creative and therefore live character of language render illegitimate as well as useless recourse to definition as an absolute and definitive remedy to the mystifications of language.

The influence of metaphorical meaning is active even when we are not aware of it. We could distinguish, on the one hand, between metaphorical signifying paths which have already been traced and which are so deeply rooted in the consciousness of the utterer and the interpreter that we would seem to be dealing with simple, fixed and definite meaning, and, on the other, metaphorical signifying paths which are immediately recognizable as such owing to their inventiveness, creativity and capacity for innovation, achieved by matching interpretants that are distant from each other in the sign network thereby attaining signifying results that are completely new and unexpected, unpredictable. Even though, programmatically, we may choose between the "literal" and the "metaphorical", in reality this is nothing but a pseudo-choice, with the sole effect of ensuing in artificial exaggeration in one sense or in the other (cf. Petrilli 1995a, chap. 13).

3. *Equivocation and figurative language*

The widespread, unconscious and implicit action of analogy and metaphor in everyday language (a part from its determining presence in scientific-philosophical language), requires that the study of these meaning devices be systematically introduced into educational programs with continual testing on a practical level according to the criteria of effectiveness on interlocutors in communication. To this end both Welby and Vailati, who fully approved of her studies, insisted on the opporteness of a *critique of imagery* and analogy, on the need to create habits of analysis, verification and classification of expressive means in general, especially of verbal signs (the sign *par excellence* of conscious and rational life) from infancy. As says Vailati in a letter to Welby of 1898:

I believe that the exposition and classification of verbal fallacies and, above all, their *caricatures* (in *jeux de mots*), to be one of most effectual pedagogic contrivances for creating the

habit of perceiving the ambiguities of language. It is a remedy somewhat analogous to that resorted to by Lacedaemons, who, in order to keep alive in their sons the horror to intoxication, compelled them to assist to the *dégoutants* deeds and sayings of the ebrious Ilots (Vailati/Welby, 12 July 1898, in Vailati 1971: 142).

The bad use of language involves the bad use of logic ensuing in negative consequences on evolutionary development, on a practical level as well as from the point of view of ethics. On promoting the need for "language study", Welby insists on the strict interrelation between language, thought, action and values maintaining that bad or faulty conceptualization and the proposal of false problems — for example, the fallacious contrast established between "free will" and "determinism", between "freedom" and "necessity" —, can largely be reconducted to problems of language, to bad linguistic use. Language and logic, signs and inferential processes are identified in their inevitable inseparability and reciprocal interdependency.

This induces Welby to analyze verbal language not simply to describe it, but to explain it with the aim of transforming it, regenerating it and subjecting it to conscious and critical use. For such work Welby indicates the child with its inclination for investigation and enquiry, its curiosity, and questions, the critique *par excellence*, as a possible model for the significian. Infact, Welby proposes the provokation of questions, of a critical standpoint, of different points of view, of confrontation and comparison, of interrelations as against the monologizing constriction of the order of discourse. She insists on the need of introducing a "significal education" for the acquisition of a significal method from the very first years of schooling, as she says to Ogden in a letter of 1911: "Significal education must begin in nurseries and primary school; the instinct of clearness, now oppressed under the weight of convention and rendered inert, must be encouraged and stimulated by the definitive defeat of convention [...] the desire of expressing as well as of knowing and inferring will always be stimulated and oriented: in this way anarchic as much as dogmatic tendencies will gradually be inverted into interpretive tendencies [...] so that it will be possible to say what we really intend to say and to act according to our true intent — that is, purpose" (Welby/Ogden, 24 March 1911; on the unpublished correspondence between Ogden and Welby, cf. Petrilli 1995b).

Vailati, one of Welby's most fascinated readers, shares the aims of her research as he was to say in a letter to her of 19 March 1903 in which he lists the following three points in common with his own:

- 1) Your insisting on the need for a critique of imagery, for a testing of analogies and metaphors (especially when "unconsciously" or semiunconsciously" used, as it is always the case in the *current* and *vulgar* ones).

2) Your warning against the tendency of pedantry and school-learning to discourage the development of linguistic resources, by the inhibitions of those spontaneous variations that are the necessary condition of organic growth.

3) Your valuation of the practical and speculative importance of raising language from the irrational and instinctive to the rational and volitional plane; in which it is considered as a means or contrivance for the performance of determined functions (representative, inferential, communicational, etc.) and for the attainment of given ends (Vailati/Welby, 19 marzo 1903, in Vailati 1971: 144).

Welby and Vailati both focused on the problem of linguistic expressivity, meaning and argumentation and, therefore, on the problem of the relation between language and thought (cf. Welby/Vailati, 27 Feb. 1907). As a response to linguistic anarchy, both Welby and Vailati, as we have anticipated, constantly underline the need for critical reflection upon language from childhood and, therefore, of reflecting on "questioni di parole" (Vailati), on "verbal questions" (Welby), in their radical interconnection with the processes of argumentation and knowledge. Vailati's article of 1905, "I tropi della logica", which centers upon the problem of the use of metaphors taken from the physical world, is directly inspired, as he explicitly declares, by Welby's book of 1903 *What is meaning?* (Vailati 1905b: 21). But in his article "Alcune osservazioni", which analyzes in particular the role of analogy and confrontation in the development of knowledge, Vailati had already dealt with similar questions to those proposed by Welby in "Sense, Meaning and Interpretation", her paper of 1896 (Vailati 1899: 71-72). He, in fact, theorizes the method of comparison and confrontation among signs and different semiotic fields to the end of highlighting convergences and divergences among the different disciplines, among the different fields of knowledge and culture. In another essay of 1905, "La ricerca dell'impossibile", Vailati confronts the formula of moral discourse with those of geometry, while in "La grammatica dell'algebra", of 1908, verbal language is confronted with the language of algebra. The method developed by Vailati, which we may no doubt consider as an application of Welby's interpretive-translative method, enters the project of signification and represents a real contribution to this new science. Both believed it was necessary to make logico-linguistic mechanisms emerge to the level of conscious life in the effort to defeat the inadequacy of our inferences and interpretive capacity generally. And Welby often repeats, as in the following passage where she discusses the difference between fact and idea to illustrate her analogy between communicative context and natural environment, interpretation can only be improved by improving our signifying capacity which involves developing our understanding of meaning:

Taking both words in the generally accepted English sense what in the last resort is the difference between Fact and Idea? What is that essential meaning of both which, if changed, will necessitate a new word to express what we are losing? Surely there can be no doubt of the answer. If we can say of any supposed fact that it is false: unreal from one point of view, untrue from another (these again never to be confounded), it ceases to be fact. No fact can be either unreal or untrue, only our idea of

it. Otherwise we may as well say at once that the real may be the delusive, or the true may be the deceptive. Of course the 'real' tends to become illusory to us, and the true deceptive, owing to the inadequacy of our inferences, which is again due to our little-developed interpretative power. But this must become more adequate when we have learnt to make sense, meaning, and significance our central concern, and have developed our sensifying and signifying faculties (Welby 1983: 40-41).

4. *The fallacy of invariable "plain, obvious, common-sense meaning"*

In "Meaning and Metaphor", of 1893, Welby criticizes the concept of "plain meaning", underlining in both a pedagogic and theoretical perspective, the need to recognize the symbolic character of language, of becoming aware of the widespread — though often unconscious — use of analogies and metaphors, and therefore of examining the relationship between symbolic systems and what they symbolize: "[...] we might begin by learning better what part symbolism plays in the rituals of expression, and ask ourselves what else is language itself but symbolism, and what it symbolizes. We should then examine anew the relations of the 'symbolic' to the 'real'; of image, figure, metaphor, to what we call literal or actual. For this concerns us all. Imagery runs in and out, so to speak, from the 'symbolic' to the 'real' world and back again (Welby 1985b, trad.it.: 82).

Theorization of the polyvalent and changing character of meaning is accompanied by the critique of the myth of "*plain, common-sense meaning*", of "*plain and obvious meaning*", and by the conviction of the need to free the text from the prejudice of interpretation restrictively understood in terms of decodification. And therefore while we indicate the question "what do we really mean?" as one of primary importance, being an invitation to clarify meanings in order to understand the significance, the import of language, the ultimate sense of an expression, at the same time with her critique of plain meaning, a mere fallacy, Welby (cf. 1985b: 513; 1983: 143) criticizes the tendency to reductionism and oversimplification throughout her work, and therefore the fallacy that a text may evolve into a single reading, into an absolute and definitive interpretant valid for all times.

"Clear", "plain", and "convincing" discourse paradoxically often proposes reductive and mystifying simplicity, obscure and perverse discourse. This occurs with our use of the concepts of "plain meaning", "common sense", "common place" themselves when used under the mask of "simplification" and "clearness" thereby forcefully reducing the plurivocality of meaning and expression to the monologic level of a single meaning, as when, for example, metaphorical meaning is exchanged for univocal, fixed and definite meaning (Welby 1985b: 510-516). Mystifications are often the result of a lack of awareness of the semiotic or signifi- cational consistency of signs, of the role of the enthymeme, the unsaid, the implicit in discourse (which may change, develop or even disappear), of the fact that words and signs in general have a signifying history of their own.

Understanding and communication stand upon the unsaid, implicit meaning, upon that which is understood.

Welby theorizes a dynamical, structural and generative conception of meaning which goes hand in hand with her critique of the concept of invariable, uniform, univocal meaning and of the description of words and locutions as though they were numbers, tags or symbols enjoying unanimous consent. The processes of metaphorization and symbolization have neither systemic nor typological delimitations, but invest the whole network of signs and sometimes belong to interpretive paths which are so deeply rooted in language that they would seem to be, though wrongly so, homologated to "plain meaning". Consequently, through her reevaluation of the "plurivocal" and "polylogic" import of language — even though she does not use just these terms — Welby denounces ambiguity ensuing from a reductive description of meaning itself.

As we have already stated, while recognizing its usefulness in restricted cases, definition cannot account for and express the ambiguity of language, its alterity, understood as the condition itself of significance and successful communication. Therefore, more than resort to definition to solve problems of language, Welby proposes that we search for a solution by applying her theory of meaning, with particular reference to her triad "sense", "meaning" and "significance" and to the distinction established between "plain meaning", "actual" or "literal", "direct" meaning and "figurative meaning", "indirect" or "reflective" meaning. Only in the light of an adequate theory of meaning can definition be of any use, though never as a remedy to the problems of linguistic equivocation, for beyond the value it may effectively reveal within the limits of technical language, it eliminates the expressive plasticity or flexibility of words and therefore responds inadequately to their inherent liveliness with lifelessness and inertia (cf. Welby 1983: 2; Petrilli 1998a: VI.1; Ponzio 1985, 1988).

5. The fallacy of "universal language". Common speech

Welby explicitly criticizes the attempt to overcome the diversity among languages through recourse to a universal language as a means of defeating obstacles to mutual understanding. Such an attempt, whether it consists in imposing an already existent natural language over others, or in constructing an artificial language, solves the problem of communication, of increase in linguistic expressivity, of significance only apparently, if that. The great variety of languages and dialects, jargons, slangs, etc. favors the development of our linguistic-cognitive resources. So rather than artificially impose a universal language which would involve leveling our human cultural-linguistic-psychological patrimony, Welby recognizes a source of wealth in distinction and diversity among languages and the practices associated to them for the processes of signification, interpretation, communication. In Welby's vision of the world, linguistic and nonlinguistic, differences — which engender other differences as part of an open totality in continual evolution

— are not the cause of division and silence, but rather favor the possibility of interconnection and therefore the processes of mutual signifying enrichment (cf. Welby 1983: 212).

The expression "common meaning", as understood by Welby, indicates that signifying material which makes possible both the individuality or singularity of a work, that is its specificity, alterity, on the one hand, as well as its universal validity for man on the other. Analogously to the concept of "common speech" (*parlare comune*) as theorized by Ferruccio Rossi-Landi (cf. 1998), Welby's own concepts of "common language", "common speech", "common meaning" has nothing to do with the "ordinary language" or "everyday language" of the English analytical philosophers, which constitutes but one of the sectors subtended by "common language" or "common speech". Rather with these terms she indicates common signifying material, the semiotic material operating both in the great multiplicity of languages and jargons forming a single natural language, as well as in all the different languages, cultures and sign systems, verbal and nonverbal. Such material constitutes the "foundation of all sectorial differences of speech", of "mere technical or secondary meanings", says Welby in a letter to Thomas H. Huxley dating back approximately to the years 1882-1885 (in Welby 1929: 102), and therefore of all signifying processes in their varied articulation.

The expressions "common meaning" and "common speech" denote a sort of *a priori* of language in a Kantian sense, a level of reference common to all language, repeatable and constant material shared by all human beings, all languages, a group of operations that go to form the very condition of expressivity in the various different languages. It concerns all fundamental similarities, homologies, in biological and social structure that subtend and unify all human communities beyond historical-cultural and geographical differences and their local variations. To the end of identifying this common field, this common patrimony of social communicative techniques which allows for the passage from one universe of discourse to another, which makes communication among and in the different natural languages possible, among and in the various technical and sectorial languages as well as among and in everyday and colloquial language, as says Rossi-Landi, it will be necessary to focus on underlying processes and identify the empirical procedures — whether a question of translating, teaching, learning, or simply conversing — accomplished by all linguistic speakers of any language (cf. Rossi-Landi 1998: 204ff.).

The terms "common speech", "common language", "common meaning", "common sense" do not intend to undervalue the great multiplicity of languages, nor monologically reconduct the diversity of languages to a mythical original language, an *Ursprache*, to the universal linguistic structures of some *Logos*, or to biologicistic laws that govern and unify all human languages. On the contrary, they recognize the value of the plurilinguistic and pluridiscursive character of speech, keeping well away from the monologicistic temptations traceable, for example, in Chomskyian linguistic theory which indeed and by no incident fails to explain the communicative function of language or its social and intersubjective dimensions. The notion of common speech, as observed

by Rossi-Landi (cf. Ponzio 1988: 26), does not contrast with plurilingualism, that is with the simultaneous presence of the great multiplicity of different languages: on the contrary, the notion of common speech alludes to the similarity of functions carried out by different languages which in their diversity satisfy analogous needs of expression and communication and, therefore, it explains and justifies difference, variability and multiplicity among languages in terms of the need to develop different expedients, to find different solutions and to use different resources to satisfy the fundamental and common needs of expression and communication as they are perceived by different traditions in experience and expressivity.

6. *Critical common sensism and pragmatism*

Even when elaborating what is considered by current scientific conceptions to be appropriate technical terminology, both Welby and Peirce believe that we should begin with a critical reading of common experience, common sense, common speech, here intended in the sense of everyday language and meaning, because of their widespread and often unconscious presence in technical language itself (for temporo-spatial relations, for example, cf. Peirce/Welby 16 Dec. 1904, in Hardwick 1977: 48). Any study whatsoever, including the philosophical, must elaborate a "technical nomenclature" whose every term has a single definite meaning universally accepted among the experts of the subject, as says Peirce (cf. CP 5.). According to his ethics of terminology, a scientifically valid nomenclature that breaks with individual habits and preferences and satisfies the requisite of unanimity among the specialists must be supported by moral principle and inspire a sense of decency, of respect, in all. The introduction of a new conception in philosophy calls for the invention of acceptable terms to express it. Such terms should be used always according to their original meanings by the scientific community, nor should new technical terms be introduced denoting the same things, considered in the same relations (CP 5.413).

By comparison with the other sciences philosophy is a rather peculiar case insofar as it presents the need for *popular words* in *popular senses*, not as part of its own terminological apparatus but as objects of its study. Philosophical language, therefore, requires special terminology — such as that supplied by Aristotele, the scholastics, Kant — that takes its distances and is distinct from the language of *common speech*. "It is good economy for philosophy", says Peirce, "to provide itself with a vocabulary so outlandish that loose thinkers shall not be tempted to borrow its words". Kant, however, in Peirce's view a confused pragmatist, made the mistake of not using the adjectives "objective" and "subjective" in a sufficiently specialized sense so that they ended up altogether losing their usefulness in philosophy. On the basis of such premises Peirce then proceeds to list seven rules to form an ideal philosophical terminology and system of logical symbols (cf. CP 2.223-226).

Peirce's critical common-sensism maintains that no man is endowed with an infallible introspective power into the secrets of his own heart, to know just what he believes and what he doubts. It also maintains that there exist indubitable beliefs that are more or less constant. Such beliefs partake of the nature of instincts intended in a broad sense. They concern matters that come within the reach of primitive man and they are very vague (fire burns) though they are not perfectly so. A philosopher should regard an important proposition as indubitable only after having systematically endeavoured to attain to a doubt of it, says Peirce, remembering that genuine doubt does not ensue from a mere effort of will but must be the expression of experience. An indubitable proposition can be false, but insofar as we do not doubt a proposition we must regard it as perfectly true, perfectly certain. While recognizing that certain propositions are each individually perfectly certain, we must also admit the possibility that one or more of them may be false (cf. *CP* 5.498). In any case, doubt as theorized by the critical common-sensist is not doubt as envisaged by the Oxonian intellectual, doubt for its own sake, for the sheer pleasure of argumentation. The clever pragmatist does not love the delusory power of brute force, but rather the creative power of reasonableness which subdues all other forms of power and rules over them in the name of knowledge and love. As a supporter of reasonableness, the pragmatist highly invests doubt, though not amiable, with moral value.

The clauses of critical common sensism are relevant to the pragmatist insofar as they evidence the conditional character of belief, "that the substance of what he thinks lies in a conditional resolve", and the need for the quest for truth as the only way to satisfying the wishes of the heart (*CP* 5.499). The pragmatist is open minded and free of prejudice and as such he is the most open to conviction, the most careful to distinguish between truth and falsity, probability and improbability. The pragmatist enquires into the problem of the relationship between inferences and the facts they derive from, and establishes a relation of affinity between them, that is to say between thought and action in general. Beginning with the assumption that action in general is mostly guided by instinct, pragmatism establishes that belief as well is a question of instinct and desire (as an example Peirce indicates the general impossibility, for intellectuals as well, of holding one's breath for up to five minutes). And while it is true that with the evolution of the species instincts are ruled by the development to varying degrees of self-control, they are not dominated completely. Given, therefore, the familiarity and almost invariability of irresistible instinctual desire the inevitable interconnection between pragmatism and critical common sensism should not be doubted.

7. Generality and vagueness

The only important alternative to pragmatism, and of which in any case Peirce was critical, is traditional logic which maintained that thought has no meaning except itself and that

substance is a category, indeed an irregular pluralism of functions (cf. *CP* 5.500). Logicians have elaborated a number of different lists of categories, but all agree that those concepts which are categories are all simple and are the only simple concepts. But the fact that something may be true of one category that is not true of another does not imply that these differences constitute the specificity of the concepts: "Each is other than each of the rest but this difference is unspecifiable and thus indefinite. At the same time there is nothing indefinite in the concepts themselves" (*CP* 5.501). Peirce proceeds to establish a relationship of affinity between the differences thus described connected with concepts and the different qualities of feeling. That is to say the differences are perceived, just as we perceive different perfumes of different flowers, but the different qualities which may be predicated of each odor do not at all constitute the odors, nor are they part of the smells themselves. As to their relations nothing can be predicate except that each is other than each. Therefore those relations are indefinite while there is no indefiniteness about the feelings related. On Peirce's account, concepts as analyzed by the logicians are nothing but another kind of qualities of feeling, and though the logician would never admit this on the grounds that concepts are general while feelings are not, he could not demonstrate this position. Peirce, instead, maintains that

[Concepts and feelings] are different no doubt; but the difference is altogether indefinite. It is precisely like the difference between smells and colours. It must be so, because at the very outset they defined concepts as qualities of feeling, not in these very words of course, but in the very meaning of these words when they said that concepts possess, as immediate objects, all the characters that they possess at all, each in itself, regardless of anything else (*CP* 5.501).

The sectators of individualism would agree that reality and existence are coextensive, in other words that reality and existence are either alike true or alike false of every subject, have the same meaning, or *Inhalt*. Many logicians would refuse such a position as a *reductio ad absurdum* of individualism, the two meanings to their mind clearly not being the same: "*reality* means a certain kind of non-dependence upon thought, and so is a cognitionary character, while *existence* means reaction with the environment, and so is a dynamic character". A misunderstanding characteristic of individualists is to believe that all other men are individualists too, including the scholastic realists whom they thought believed that "universals exist"; in reality many great thinkers of the past did not believe that "generals" exist but regarded them as "modes of determination of individuals", and such modes were recognized as being of the nature of thought. The metaphysical side of pragmatism, says Peirce, attempts to solve the problem by accepting the existence of "real generals" and by searching for the answer to the question: "In what way can a general be unaffected by any thought about it?" (cf. *CP* 5. 503).

Another misunderstanding which Peirce clarifies in this: for the pragmatist the import or adequate ultimate interpretant of a concept is contained in a "habit of conduct", or "general moral determination of whatever procedure there *may come to be*". The import of any word (except perhaps a pronoun) is not limited to what is in the utterer's mind *actualiter*, but, on the contrary, it is what is in the mind perhaps not even *habitualiter*, but simply *virtualiter*. Every animal has habits and therefore has innate habits, and insofar as it has cognitive powers it must also have "*in posse* innate cognitive habits", this being Peirce's interpretation of innate ideas. The pragmatist shares these positions with a critical philosophy of common sense and should not be considered as an individualist neither of the metaphysical nor of the epistemological type.

In line with critical common sense, Peirce maintains that all beliefs are *vague*, indeed the more they are indubitable the more they are vague, recognizing the misunderstood importance of *vagueness* even in mathematical thought. Vagueness is simply constitutive of belief, inherent to it and to the propositions that express it. It is the "antithetical analogue of generality".

A sign is objectively *general*, in so far as, leaving its effective interpretation indeterminate, it surrenders to the interpreter the right of completing the determination for himself. "Man is mortal." "What man?" "Any man you like." A sign is objectively *vague*, in so far as, leaving its interpretation more or less indeterminate, it reserves for some other possible sign or experience the function of completing the determination. "This month", says the almanac-oracle, "a great event is to happen." "What event?" "Oh, we shall see. The almanac doesn't tell that." The *general* might be defined as that to which the principle of excluded middle does not apply. A triangle in general is not isosceles nor equilateral; nor is a triangle in general scalene. The *vague might be defined as that to which the principle of contradiction does not apply*. For it is false neither that an animal (in a vague sense) is male, nor that an animal is female (CP 5.505).

Generality and vagueness do not coincide, indeed they oppose each other, though on a formal level they are on a par. A sign cannot be at one and the same time both vague and general in the same respect, "since insofar as the right of determination is not distinctly extended to the interpreter it remains the right of the utterer. Furthermore a sign can avoid being vague or general if it is not indeterminate, but no sign can ever be absolutely and completely determinate. In the light of his logic of relations no proposition has a single subject, but rather it has different levels of reference. Even if only implicitly all propositions necessarily refer to the truth, "the universe of all universes", therefore they refer to the same determinately singular subject, understood both by the utterer and the interpreter, and which is assumed by all to be real. At a more restricted immediate level all propositions also refer to a non general subject.

And here Peirce reflects further on the role of vagueness. Communication among interlocutors is never completely definite, completely non vague, for where there subsists the

possibility of variation, absolute precision is impossible. So, beyond expressing his hope that qualities of feeling among different persons may one day be compared by physiologists and thereby no longer represent a source of *misunderstanding*, Peirce identifies a cause of misunderstanding in the intellectual purport of communication and in the diversity of experience among different persons, so that communication is necessarily vague "because no man's interpretation of words is based on exactly the same experience as any other man's" (CP 5.506). And, therefore, just as when we look closely at the detail of a painting we lose sight of its overall sense, in the same way the more we attempt to be precise, the more unattainable precision seems, says Peirce, even when dealing with intellectual conceptions.

Vagueness is the common matter that subtends communication and constitutes a condition of possibility of communication itself, an a priori condition for the formulation of the propositions communicated. Such vagueness is strictly dependent upon reference to the different experiences of each one of us, ranging from organico-instinctual life to intellectual life. Thus understood, more than postulate vagueness as the cause of *misunderstanding*, Peirce, as does Welby, leads us to recognize it as the condition of possibility of communication thanks to which it is possible to formulate the various propositions that circulate as a part of communicative exchange. And communication is achieved in terms of dialogue, whether interior dialogue or dialogue with other interlocutors external to oneself. Variability in the experience of the single person implies variability at the level of explicit interpretation, but also at the level of implicit understanding. Therefore dialogue and understanding as negotiated in communication are strictly dependent upon vagueness, variability, the implicit, the unsaid. Understanding is possible thanks to the understood and as such it is always vague, so much so that the more we attempt to be precise the less we understand each other. To explicit the indeterminate and render it visible means to undertake new interpretive courses, new signifying paths and therefore to introduce new implications, new variables, a new dose of vagueness. In the last analysis, then, communication is dialogic investigation and approximation on the part of interlocutors with respect to the referent of discourse, both the general referent, that is, truth, as well as the restricted and immediate referent. Saying, explicitation, determination and, therefore, understanding, stand firmly rooted in the understood, the unspoken, implied meaning, in indeterminacy and vagueness (for further developments of this discourse, cf. Petrilli 1998c). And all these things together, as Welby and Peirce teach us together with the other authors mentioned in this paper, form our communication universe.

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3. Entendre et sous-entendre: la nature communautaire du sous-entendu

La compréhension de l'énonciation complète, constituant un tout, ne se ramène pas à l'*identification* des éléments et des formes linguistiques qui entrent dans sa composition et qui sont réitérables et identiques dans leur répétition (le mots, les formes morphologiques et syntaxiques, etc.), mais à la compréhension de son *sens*. Dans la compréhension de l'énonciation nous pouvons distinguer deux *interprétants*, entre eux dialectiquement connexes: 1) l'*interprétant d'identification*, qui est le résultat d'un processus de *décodage* concernant l'énonciation dans son aspect abstrait de *phrase*, c'est à dire sa composante de "signalité", que nous pouvons appeler la *signification*

2) l'*interprétant de compréhension répondant*, qui est le résultat d'un processus de participation, de prise de position, d'engagement en une compréhension responsive active, et qui concerne l'énonciation dans son aspect concret, vivant, d' *énoncé*, c'est à dire sa composante de "signité", que Bakhtine-Volochinov (1929) appelle *thème* et que nous préférons appeler *sense* .

La signification, et donc la phrase, est l'énonciation dans sa composante réitérable et identique dans sa réitération. Le sens, et donc l'énoncé, est le caractère non réitérable et historiquement unique de l'énonciation. C'est le sens, expression d'une situation concrète, qui donne naissance à l'énonciation. L'énonciation postule l'interprétant de compréhension répondant, c'est à dire la compréhension du sens. Ce que l'énonciation attend, ce n'est pas son identification, son interprétation passive; ce qu'elle attend, c'est une réponse (un accord, une adhésion, une objection, une exécution, etc., bref: une réponse à son sens. La signification est l' appareil technique de

réalisation du sens et l'identification n'est que le stade initial, préparatoire à une réponse (verbale ou non verbale).

Nous quittons au linguistes la phrase, c'est à dire la partie de l'énonciation qui se rapporte à la signalité, au processus de décodage, à la signification et à son corrélaté, l'identification. Notre analyse est consacrée à ce qui constitue le *bout* de l'énonciation, qui est formulée, dans sa même structure syntactique, *en fonction de l'interprétant de compréhension répondant*. Nous examinerons l'*énoncé*, la composante spécifiquement ségnique de l'énonciation. En autres termes, c'est le *sens* qui nous intéresse. C'est le sens qui fait de l'énonciation, à la différence de la phrase, une relation entre un locuteur et un interlocuteur, et c'est à la compréhension du sens que le processus de décodage est subordonné.

Dans l'énoncé, ou dans le sens, c'est à dire dans l'énonciation considérée comme un tout unique, nous pouvons distinguer deux parties: 1) *une partie verbale actualisée*, 2) *une partie sous-entendue* (v. Bakhtine-Volochinov 1926, tr. fr.: 190), ou comme le dit Rossi-Landi (1961, 2ème éd. 1998) 1) les "*significati di partenza*", le sens en partance, le sens déjà explicité, et 2) les "*significati aggiuntivi*", le sens successif, résultat d'un processus d'explicitation de ce qui, dans l'énonciation, est dit implicitement. *Entendre l'énoncé c'est comprendre, saisir surtout et aussi ce que l'énonciation sous-entend*. Après l'identification de l'énonciation, c'est à dire de la signification, l'interprétant de compréhension répondant se dirige de la partie verbal actualisé du sens à sa partie sous entendue.

Le rôle que joue le sous-entendu dans le sens et donc pour l'interprétant de compréhension répondant change dans les différents genres du discours.

Dans l'*énonciation quotidienne* cet rôle est prépondérant. Cela découle du fait que dans les genres du discours quotidien, les genres de la conversation et du dialogue familial, surtout dans le discours oral, mais aussi dans les genres quotidiens écrits (la lettre personnelle, le billet, les annotations dans l'agenda, le carnet de notes), le sens dépend de la situation concrète dans laquelle l'énonciation est formulée. L'énoncé des genres quotidiens est lié aux conditions d'un moment donné, aux éléments non verbaux de la situation. Non seulement le sens mais aussi l'appareil technique pour la réalisation du sens (les mots, les formes morphologiques et syntaxiques, les intonations) se rattachent, appartient, dans certaines circonstances de façon inséparable, à la situation concrète où ils se réalisent. Par conséquent, généralement dans le sens de l'énonciation des genres du discours quotidien, la partie sous-entendue de l'énoncé est certainement supérieure à l'autre, la partie verbale actualisée.

Si avec Bakhtine (1952-53, tr. fr.: 265-72) nous prenons en considération la différence essentielle qui existe entre les *genres premiers du discours* (le discours simple, quotidien) et les *genres seconds* (le roman, le théâtre, le discours scientifique, idéologique, etc.) *du discours* (le

discours complexe, principalement écrit, appartenant à des précises circonstances de l'échange culturel), nous pouvons observer que dans ces genres seconds, qui absorbent et transmutent les genres premiers de la parole directe et l'échange verbal immédiat, le sous-entendu du discours des genres premiers inséré dans le discours d'un genre second ne dépend pas directement de la situation concrète et des éléments non-verbaux, mais son renvoi se réalise par la *médiation du texte (contexte) verbal*. Dans l'énonciation d'un genre second, l'intégration entre verbal et non-verbal qui nous donne la possibilité de comprendre le sous-entendu n'existe qu' *à travers le texte verbale dans son tout*, par exemple un roman.

Nous pouvons dire donc que *le caractère du sous-entendu se réalise avant tout dans lae choix d'un genre du discours*. Le sous-entendu fait partie du sens, de l'énoncé, en d' autres termes, de la partie non réitérable et historiquement unique de l'énonciation. Mais *il appartient aussi à un genre de discours donné*. Le genre qui est une type relativement stable d'énonciations caractérisé par sa structuration particulière, par son type de rapport entre locuteur, allocutaire, et les autres partenaires de l'échange verbal.

Le genre du discours est le dépôt de la mémoire communautaire dans la production des énonciations et des textes. C' est un système spécifique de signification, relatif à un certain type de pratique signifiante, une modalité objective, matérielle, de la conscience communautaire de l'interprétation expressive et de l'interprétation réceptive. Dans *La méthode formelle* (Bakhtine-Medvedev 1928) — où l'on critique le formalistes russes d'avoir conduit leurs analyse en faisant abstraction du genre littéraire qui est réduit à une composition mécanique a-posteriori de procédés — le genre est caractérisé comme une méthode collective d'orientation dans la réalité, un modèle de vision de la réalité que se constitue historiquement dans la communication sociale: "la réalité d'un genre et la réalité abordable à un genre sont organiquement liées entre elles" (ibid.: 281). Comme le dit Julia Kristeva, le genre est un modèle social du monde, un modèle idéologique. Le choix d'un genre est un choix d'une vision du monde produite par de pratiques communautaire de le change verbale.

La sous-entendu en faisant part d'un genre donné, a une nature communautaire de la même façon du genre. Nous préférons "communautaire" à "social", parce que le "social" peut être, dans l'interprétation mais aussi dans la réalité, la moyenne ou le résultat de actions orientées et conçues comme originaires individuelles. Au contraire nous disons "communautaire" en entendant ce qui n'est pas originaires individuel ou psychologique, ou en entendant, si l'on préfère, un "social" a-priori, c'est a dire qui concerne la *matière historique et social* de la *semiosi humaine*

La même responsivité active de l'interprétant du sens est différente dans les différents genres du discours et le degré de cette activité de l'interprétant de compréhension répondant est fort variable. La compréhension responsive active de l'entendu peut avoir une manifestation verbale ou non verbale (par exemple dans les genres du dialogue quotidien, dans l'ordre militaire standardisé,

dans les différents genres de documents du discours bureaucratique standardisé), mais peut être aussi une compréhension responsive sous-entendue elle même.

Dans certains genres du discours il faut que ce qui est entendu reste sous-entendu au moment de la compréhension. Des genres particuliers du discours prévoient précisément le sous-entendu non seulement dans l'énonciation du locuteur mais aussi dans la compréhension du récepteur (l'auditeur, le lecteur). Les genres seconds, dans la plupart des cas, ne se fondent que sur une compréhension responsive sous-entendue. Bakhtine (1952-53, tr. fr.: 275) parle de compréhension responsive "muette".

Mais cela peut se prêter à des équivoques, parce qu' aussi dans l'exécution de l'ordre sous la forme d'un acte non verbal l'interprétant peut être "muet". De toute façon, surtout dans les genres seconds, la compréhension immédiate est sous-entendue, mais, comme le dit Bakhtine, il s'agit là d'une "compréhension responsive avec action à retardement: "tôt ou tard, ce qui a été entendu et compris de façon active trouvera un écho dans le discours ou le comportement subséquent de l'auditeur. Les genres seconds de l'échange verbal, dans la plupart de cas, escomptent précisément ce type de compréhension responsive active avec action à retardement" (*ibidem*).

Les sous-entendu ne peut être ramené ni à la "langue" ni à la "parole" de la dichotomie saussurienne. Il n'est pas ni abstraitement "individuel" dans le sens de la "parole" ni abstraitement "social" dans le sens de la "langue" de cette dichotomie. Il a un caractère *communautaire* qui est diversement organisé et prend des formes variées dans ces types relativement stables d'énoncés qui sont les genres du discours. Le sous-entendu est indissocialement lié à la forme commune du genre de l'énonciation (cf. Bakhtine-Volochinov 1926, tr. fr.: 190-191). La communauté peut se donner au niveau du couple, de la famille, de la profession, de la classe sociale, de la nation, de l'époque, etc. Elle n'est pas seulement communauté contingente, d'individus donnés: le discours amoureux des partenaires d'un couple, ou les discours d'une paire d'amis, ne se réduit pas à l'horizon commun des ces deux personnes seulement, mais présuppose que les locuteurs se servent d'un patrimoine commun de valeurs et de modèles de comportement verbal et non verbal qui fait parti d'un horizon plus large, et dans l'espace et dans le temps, de leur horizon privé.

Le contexte extra-verbal de l'énonciation joue un rôle fort important dans le non-dit. Mais le renvoi à ce dernier dans le discours n'est pas direct. Et cela non seulement dans les genres seconds du discours, comme nous l'avons dit. Dans les genres primaires le renvoi à la situation extra-verbale est toujours mêlé à une perspective évaluative qui situe la situation et la développe en esquissant le plan et l'organisation d'une action future. Par conséquent, la situation réelle et matérielle, en s'intégrant dans un projet, s'intègre dans une communauté non moins réelle et matérielle de évaluations. Le contexte extra-verbal de la partie sous-entendue de l'énonciation est le contexte d'une connaissance commune, compréhension et évaluation de la situation communicative.

Notre tâche est d'essayer de comprendre le rapport qui lie, dans le sens, le non-dit à ce qui est dit, la partie sous-entendu à la partie verbale. Pour ce faire, nous examinerons plus précisément certains aspects de l'énonciation dans le discours de la vie quotidienne, donc la sphère des genres premiers. Mais nous ne manquerons pas de mettre à profit l'avertissement bakhtinien de ne pas prendre pour point de repère les seuls genres premiers en oubliant les genres seconds et l'interrelation entre ces deux genres. Ces deux genres s'éclairent réciproquement. L'analyse des seuls genres premiers conduit à les trivialisier en opérant le plus souvent d'après des énonciations délibérément primitifs: un exemple de "trivialisiation extrême", dit Bakhtine (1952-53, tr. fr.: 267), est représenté par la linguistique béhavioriste américaine.

Bakhtine compare l'énonciation quotidienne à l'"enthimème". En logique, l'enthimème est le syllogisme dont l'une des prémisses n'est pas exprimée, mais sous-entendue. Par exemple dans l'affirmation "Socrate est un homme, donc il est mortel", on sous-entend: "tout les hommes sont mortels" (cf. Bakhtine-Volochinov 1926: 191). Ce que sous-entend l'énonciation quotidienne est une *communauté d'évaluation*. Comme nous l'avons dit, l'horizon commun d'évaluation et le groupe social qui lui correspond peuvent être plus ou moins larges pour ce qui concerne la quantité des personnes coïntéressés autant que l'espace et le temps de cet horizon. Le non-dit, bien entendu, est représenté par l'horizon spatial, temporel et sémantique de l'énonciation, par son axe paradigmatique, par des objets, des événements, des informations, des individus précis, mais tout cela est englobé dans une *communauté d'évaluation*.

Par conséquent, avec Bakhtine-Volochinov (1926), mais aussi bien avec Deleuze et Guattari (1980), nous pouvons dire que l'énonciation quotidienne est comme "un mot de passe", un "mot d'ordre". La communauté de la langue, du contexte vécu immédiate, des informations, etc. ne suffit pas à la production et à la compréhension du non-dit, du sous-entendu. Les sous-entendu peut être produit par le locuteur et compris par son interlocuteur (l'auditeur ou le lecteur) parce que ces sujets participent, comme membre ordinaires ou comme affiliés ou comme sociétaires honoraires, à titre d'hôtes, d'invités, ou comme amateurs ou infiltrés, etc., d'un *horizon communautaire d'évaluation* et donc ils connaissent les mots de passe d'une communauté étroite ou large, éphémère ou stable.

Si l'on explique l'énonciation comme parole saussurienne qui se constitue dans les deux pôles du sujet parlant et du système de la langue, non seulement nous ne pouvons pas comprendre le rapport qui lie, dans le sens, le non-dit à ce qui est dit, la partie sous-entendu à la partie verbale, mais nous ne comprendrons pas même la présence du sous-entendu et sa fonction. C'est la participation à une communauté (de couple, de famille, d'âge, de profession, de vision du monde, etc.) qui justifie, explique et fonde le sous-entendu dans l'échange verbal.

C'est le caractère de *mot d'ordre*, disent Deleuze et Guattari (1980, trad. it.: 144), la *variable* que fait des mots et des constantes phonologiques, morphologiques et syntactiques une

énonciation. C'est en tant que "mot de passe" que la *proposition* ou *phrase*, comprise comme une unité de la langue, devient un *énoncé*, compris comme unité du change verbale (pour la différence entre "proposition" et "énoncé", cf. Bakhtine 1952-53, tr. fr.: 278). Le *sens* est le passage de la signification explicite aux présuppositions des évaluations communautaires implicites.

Seulement par la faute de préjugés qui sont le résultat du psychologisme on peut se tromper en croyant que le sous-entendu du sens soit quelque chose de subjectif, qu'il s'agit d'un acte psychique, qu'il s'agit de représentations, pensées, sensations privées, qui existent dans la sphère du psychisme du locuteur. Le sous-entendu appartient à tout cela qui est, à des degrés différents, communautaire et objectif. Ce que le locuteur seul sait, voit, aime, désire, redoute, ne peut pas être sous-entendu. On ne peut sous-entendre que ce qui est commun au locuteur et à son interlocuteur, ou à son destinataire. Le sous-entendu appartient à un *nous*: voilà la condition par laquelle le *je* peut y faire allusion.

Non seulement ce qui est objet d'expérience sensible et de connaissance ne peut devenir le renvoi du sous-entendu qu'à la condition que il entre dans l'horizon de l'expérience et du savoir des interlocuteurs; mais aussi et surtout ne peut pas devenir le renvoi du sous-entendu ce qui a quelques rapports avec des émotions, des états d'âme, de intentions privées. Comme nous l'avons dit, toutes les évaluations sous-entendues ne sont pas privées, mais appartiennent à *une communauté d'évaluations*. Dans Bakhtine-Volochinov 1926 (tr. fr.: 192) nous leçons: «les émotions *individuelles* ne peuvent être que les harmoniques qui accompagnent la tonalité principale de l'évaluation *sociale*: le "je" ne peut se réaliser dans le discours qu'en s'appuyant sur le "nous"».

Entendre c'est sous-entendre. Pour communiquer il faut sous-entendre. Le fait de sous-entendre est le même signe: il dit du lien entre les interlocuteurs; il joue une fonction phatique ou de contact. Plus nous nous entendons parfaitement, plus nous sous-entendons.

Dans le *Journal du séducteur* (Kierkegaard 1843), Johannes écrit:

«Ma Cordelia! "Ma" ..."Ton", ces mots ceignent à la façon de parenthèses le pauvre contenu de mes lettres. As-tu remarqué que la distance entre les bras des parenthèses devient de plus en plus courte? Oh, ma Cordelia! C'est très beau que plus la parenthèse se vide, plus elle devient riche de sens» (1843, III: 188).

Lorsque la communication marche on ne contrôle pas — comme dans le cas où un moteur marche bien — ce qu'en permet le fonctionnement. Au contraire l'explicitation du sous-entendu, sa traduction verbale, peut avoir un effet de trouble, peut créer une situation de perplexité et résonner comme une notification, comme si le locuteur voudrait préciser des données de la situation communicative.

L'évaluation communautaire est entrée, dit Bakhtine-Volochinov 1926 (tr.fr.: 193) «dans la chair et le sang de tous les représentants de la communauté», étroite ou large soit-elle. Elle détermine en revanche le choix même des mots, organise la forme de l'énonciation et trouve son expression la plus pure dans son intonation. «L'intonation se situe toujours à la frontière du verbal et du non-verbal, du dit et du non dit» (*ibid*: 194). Dans l'intonation le locuteur exprime directement son contact avec son interlocuteur en se fondant sur les évaluations communautaires sous-entendues. Ces évaluations n'ont aucun besoin de trouver une expression verbale et d'être enfermées dans le contenu du discours. Elles ne requièrent pas de formulations verbales particulières, sauf qu'il y a une situation de crise dans la tacite entente communicative.

Ces considérations de Bakhtine-Volochinov 1926 nous les retrouvons approfondies dans *Marxisme et philosophie du langage* (Bakhtine-Volochinov 1929).

Dans ce livre, on fait remarquer que, quelle que soit l'énonciation considérée, même s'il s'agit de l'expression verbale d'un besoin quelconque, par exemple de la faim, il est certain que l'énonciation a une intonation. Cela signifie qu'elle entend en sous-entendant quelque chose et surtout en sous-entendant des évaluations communautaires. C'est la évaluation sous-entendue qui rend l'énonciation entièrement orientée socialement. Le sous-entendu est la condition du sens de ce que l'énonciation entend (cf. *ibid.*: 124).

Cela est également vrai si nous prenons l'énonciation au stade de discours intérieur. Elle se présente déjà avec son orientation, son intonation, ses sous-entendus. Par conséquent la prise de conscience, même confuse, d'une sensation quelconque, se fonde sur des sous entendus qui sont des évaluations non moins que des expériences et des connaissances (cf. *ibid.*: 129-30).

Étant donné que toute prise de conscience, à partir de la sensation, implique un discours intérieur, nous pouvons dire que non seulement l'énonciation extérieure est un *enthymème*. L'énonciation intérieure, par la quelle se constituent aussi bien nos pensées même rudimentaires que la simple prise de conscience d'une sensation quelconque, est elle même un *enthymème*. Nous en pouvons retrouver une confirmation dans les réflexions de Peirce sur le rapport entre la pensée, le signe et l'inférence (cf. Peirce, *Collected Papers*: 5.264-317). En outre, aussi pour Peirce, l'inférence intérieure, quelle que soit l'énonciation considérée par la quelle la conscience et l pensée se réalisent, est toujours orienté selon un sens d'évaluation: dans la "pensée-signé", dans le "signe mental", est présente, dit Peirce, une "qualité matérielle" qui lui confère une accentuation d'évaluation, une orientation à caractère appréciatif (cf. 5.293-4).

Dans Bakhtin-Volochinov 1927 (*Freudisme*) et dans Bakhtin-Volosinov 1929 on appelle "idéologie du quotidien" la totalité des évaluations communautaires sur le quelle se fondent les sous-entendus, et donc les senses, aussi bien dans l'énonciation du discours extérieure que celle du discours intérieur, pour la distinguer des systèmes idéologiques constitués tels que l'art, la morale,

le droit, etc. «L'idéologie du quotidien constitue le domaine de la parole intérieure et extérieure désordonnée et non fixée dans un système, qui accompagne chacun de nos actes ou gestes et chacun de nos états de conscience» (Bakhtine-Volochinov 1929, tr. fr.: 130).

Dans l'idéologie du quotidien, nous pouvons distinguer plusieurs niveaux, dont le niveaux supérieurs sont en contact direct avec les systèmes idéologiques, tandis que le niveaux inférieurs sont en contact direct avec le facteur biographique et biologique. Pour simplifier nous pouvons appeler, en suivant Bakhtin-Volochinov 1927, le complexe des niveaux supérieurs l'"idéologie officiel" et appeler le complexe des niveaux inférieurs "l'idéologie non-officielle". La première coïncide totalement avec ce que Foucault (1974) appelle "l'ordre du discours". La deuxième est constitué des niveaux inférieurs ou l'idéologie est ductile, incertaine, fuyante, hybride. Soit dans les énonciations (extérieures ou intérieures) de l'idéologie officielle, c'est à dire de l'ordre du discours, soit dans les énonciations (extérieures ou intérieures) de l'idéologie non-officielle. La possibilité d'*entendre* (comme active compréhension) se fonde sur la possibilité de *sous-tendre*, c'est à dire sur la possibilité de participation à des expériences, des contextes, des connaissances, des compétences, mais surtout à des évaluations communautaires. Sans le non-dire on ne peut pas dire. Sans le sous-entendre on ne peut pas entendre. Si l' on se méprend, c'est à cause des carences plus au niveau du sous-entendre que au niveau de l'entendre.

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In 1892 Welby anonymously presented her pamphlet entitled *The Use of Inner and Outer in Psychology: Does the Metaphor Help or Hinder?*, at the International Congress of Experimental Psychology, which was distributed among participants and duly discussed. This text collects a series of passages from various publications in psychology and philosophy which support her thesis that bad language use compromises clearness and precision of ideas and leads to false problems. These passages are commented by Welby with critical reflections on the use of figurative language, with particular reference to the use of metaphor and analogy. She evidences the negative cognitive results, for example, of a wrong use of the pairs "inner/outer", "interior/exterior", "inside/outside" "dentro/fuori", etc. as metaphors to designate the opposites "psycho/physical", "subjective/objective", "thought/thing", "conscious/unconscious". Welby met James M. Baldwin at this congress, with whom she corresponded by letter until 1908, as well as Frederik van Eeden, who under the influence of Welby's ideas gave life to the signific movement in the Netherlands (cf.

Petrilli 1998a: VII.2). *A Selection of Passages from "Mind" (January, 1876, to July, 1892), "Nature" (1870, and 1888 to 1892), "Natural Science" (1892)*, is the title of another publication by Welby, of 1893, in which she continued her critique of language underlining its importance for successful interpersonal communication. These collections were preceded by *Witnesses to Ambiguity*, 1891, also dedicated to the critique of terminology, and developed in "Meaning and Metaphor", and essay of 1893 (now 1985b) in which Welby reflects more extensively on the problem of meaning in theoretical terms, and then "Sense, Meaning and Interpretation", of 1896 (now 1985c).

In the paragraph entitled "Philosophical Nomenclature" (included in his 1905 article "What Pragmatism Is", *CP* 5.411-5.437), the first of three on pragmatism published in the journal *The Monist.*).

Another text included in the *Collected Papers*, "Pragmaticism and Critical Common-sensism" (5.497-501), which corresponds to a manuscript of 1905 originally entitled "The Basis of Pragmaticism", is articulated in the form of a dialogue between "Jules", the allusion is to the Italian critic of pragmatism Giuseppe Prezzolini, and the "Respondent", Peirce himself the pragmaticist, the form of a dialogue having been chosen as an attempt to represent the effective articulation of thought itself, which is inherently dialogic. This text is followed by another which develops it, "Consequences of Critical Common-sensism" (*CP* 5.502-537) (the reproduction of a manuscript entitled "Pragmaticism, Prag. [4]", of 1905) and is divided into four parts: "Individualism"; "Critical Philosophy and the Philosophy of Common-sense"; "The Generality of the Possibile"; "Valuation".

Peirce here refers to an article by himself published in *The Open Court* in 1892, "The Reader is Introduced to Relatives", now *CP* 3.415-424.